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Insightful problem solving is a vital part of human thinking, yet very difficult to grasp. Tradi-
tionally, insight has been investigated by using a set of established “insight tasks,” assuming 
that insight has taken place if these problems are solved. Instead of assuming that insight 
takes place during every solution of the 9 Dot, 8 Coin, and Matchstick Arithmetic Problems, 
this study explored the likelihood that solutions evoked the “Aha! experience,” which is often 
regarded as the defining characteristic of insight. It was predicted that the rates of self-
reported Aha! experiences might vary based on the necessary degree of constraint relax-
ation. The main assumption was that the likelihood of experiencing an Aha! would decrease 
with increasing numbers of constraints that must be relaxed, because several steps are 
needed to achieve a representational change and solve the problem, and thus, the main 
feature of suddenness of a solution might be lacking. The results supported this prediction, 
and demonstrated that in many cases participants do solve these classical insight problems 
without any Aha! experience. These results show the importance of obtaining insight ratings 
from participants to determine whether any given problem is solved with insight or not.
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Most people know the phenomenon that after some struggle 
with a difficult problem, the solution simply appears out of 
nowhere. Such a moment of sudden comprehension is known 
as insight. Insight is thought to follow from restructuring or 
representational change processes (Duncker, 1945; Ohls-
son, 1984). This means the problem solver sets up an initial 
mental representation of the problem that is biased because 
of unnecessary, false assumptions about the task. The result-
ing problem space is over-constrained (Ohlsson, 1992) or 
ill-defined (Kaplan & Simon, 1990). This problem represen-
tation needs to be changed in a proper way to increase the 
likelihood of solving the problem. On a phenomenological 
level of description, the moment of representational change 
is often reported being accompanied by a strong emotional 
response, the “Aha! experience” (Bühler, 1907; Gick & Lock-
hart, 1995; Kaplan & Simon, 1990). 
After 100 years of problem solving research, the cog-
nitive mechanisms underlying insight are still not fully 
understood. There are various conceptual and experimental 
reasons for that, including the repeated usage of a limited set 
of tasks assumed to be “insight problems,” combined with 
the fact that there is no clear behavioral nor neural marker 
indicating that insight has taken place (Dietrich & Kanso, 
2010), and the difficulty of discerning if a problem has been 
solved via insightful problem solving or more analytical 
processes (Metcalfe & Wiebe, 1987). This relates to another 
long-standing discussion about whether insight problems 
are something special or not (Davidson, 1995). In the past, 
some researchers have assumed that when “insight prob-
lems” are solved, then insight has taken place (Ash, Cushen, 
& Wiley, 2009; Weisberg, 1992). This reasoning is problem-
atic and becomes circular if, as Öllinger and Knoblich point 
out, “Insight problems are problems that require insight, 
and insight occurs when insight problems are solved“ (2009, 
p. 3). There have been attempts at classifying and defining the 
properties of insight problems (e.g., Weisberg, 1995), but there 
is no clear agreement on which types of problems will always 
trigger insight, because “there is no particular class of insight 
problems that necessarily requires a representational change; 
each problem can be solved without insight if the initial prob-
lem representation is adequate and the appropriate heuristics 
are available” (Öllinger, Jones, & Knoblich, 2014, p. 267).
More recently, researchers interested in detecting possible 
neural correlates of insight have begun to rely on the phe-
nomenological dimension of insight, the Aha! experience 
(e.g., Aziz-Zadeh, Kaplan, & Iacoboni, 2009; Bowden, Jung-
Beeman, Fleck, & Kounios, 2005; Sandkühler & Bhattacha-
rya, 2008) that sets it apart from more analytical modes of 
problem solving. The Aha! experience is generally described 
as very pleasant, connected with emotional arousal and with 
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a strong certainty that the solution is correct (Sternberg & 
Davidson, 1995). Most phenomenological approaches use 
subjective reports of Aha! experiences to differentiate insight-
ful (“with Aha!”) from noninsightful (“without Aha!”) solv-
ing events, assuming that “the presence or absence of insight 
resides in the solver’s solution rather than in the problem” 
(Bowden & Jung-Beeman, 2007, p. 88). From these obser-
vations, it is clear that the occurrence of insight should not 
be assumed, and can be assessed by directly asking problem 
solvers about it. Although often used in insight research, no 
prior work has asked participants to give ratings of insight 
on three widely used classical insight problems: The 9 Dot 
Problem (Maier, 1930), the 8 Coin Problem (Ormerod, Mac-
Gregor, & Chronicle, 2002), and one Matchstick Arithmetic 
Problem (e.g., Knoblich, Ohlsson, Haider, & Rhenius, 1999). 
Thus, collecting subjective Aha! ratings on these problems in 
order to verify their status as insight problems was a goal of 
the present study.
Subjective MeaSureS of inSight
The present study collected self-reports about participants’ 
Aha! experiences using the multi-dimensional definition by 
Jung-Beeman and colleagues (2004) to test whether insight 
ratings are predicted by the degree of representational 
change that might be required for each of these problems. 
Empirical studies have successfully implemented subjective 
ratings of insight for several types of problems. This has been 
mainly the case for the domain of compound remote associ-
ates (CRA problems, Bowden & Jung-Beeman, 2003). Based 
on participants’ self-reports of insight (using a definition that 
included suddenness, obviousness, and confidence), it was 
possible to detect differences between insight and noninsight 
solutions with regard to neural activity as measured by EEG 
and fMRI (Jung-Beeman et al., 2004; Subramaniam, Kounios, 
Parrish, & Jung-Beeman, 2009). Another study (Kounios et 
al., 2006) was even able to show that the neural activity dif-
fered already in a preparatory interval before the problem 
was presented, predicting whether it would later be solved 
with or without insight. Kounios and Beeman (2014) provide 
an overview on this work, but see also Dietrich and Kanso 
(2010) for a review. Ellis and colleagues combined post-hoc 
insight ratings of how suddenly the solution came to mind 
with eye tracking while participants were trying to solve 60 
anagram problems (Ellis, Glaholt, & Reingold, 2011). Partic-
ipants were presented with an array of five scrambled letters, 
four of which could be combined into a solution word, and 
the fifth letter was a distractor. They found that insight trials 
had shorter response times and different patterns of fixation 
than noninsight trials, showing that the subjective differen-
tiation made by participants was actually reflected in dif-
ferences in behavioral measures. This shows the usefulness 
of self-reports. However, they found increasingly shorter 
viewing times on the distractor item already several seconds 
prior to the response and interpreted this as evidence for a 
gradual accumulation of solution knowledge even before 
participants were aware of the solution. Importantly, this was 
found for both insight and noninsight trials, suggesting a dis-
sociation between the subjective experience of “suddenness” 
of the solution and the actual problem solving process. This 
questions the reliability of self-reports. Note that their defi-
nition of insight focused solely on suddenness in contrast to 
the multi-dimensional definition of insight as used by Jung-
Beeman and colleagues (2004) and also in the present study.
Cushen and Wiley (2012) used a single-trial design with 
only one task, the Triangle of Circles, in a large study where 
they obtained post-hoc ratings of insight (based on just two 
aspects of solution: suddenness and surprise), but also repeated 
ratings on problem features during the problem solving pro-
cess as a measure of representational change (Ash & Wiley, 
2008). In concurrence with Ellis and colleagues, they found 
a disconnect between self-reports of insight and the actual 
solution patterns. As one possible explanation for this find-
ing, they point out the difficulties in providing clear descrip-
tions of insight or Aha! that participants can use as the basis 
for their self-reports. A large variety of different instructions 
can be found in the literature, and this may be responsible for 
different findings across studies. This important point will be 
discussed in more detail at the end of the present paper.
ProbleM analySiS baSed on rePreSentational change
The theoretical framework for the present study is Öllinger’s 
extended representational change theory (eRCT, Öllinger 
et al., 2014), which is based on and elaborates Ohlsson’s 
RCT (Knoblich et al., 1999; Ohlsson, 1992). Some of the 
key assumptions of the eRCT are sketched in the following. 
First, as already discussed, any problem can be solved with 
or without insight. Second, in line with Ohlsson, insight is 
assumed to be caused by a representational change. A repre-
sentational change leads to modified prior knowledge and a 
modified search space, so that after a representational change, 
heuristics are needed to guide the search process again. Third, 
and this is a new aspect, insight problem solving is concep-
tualized as a dynamic search process that might also include 
recursive steps, that is, repeated instances of search, impasse, 
and representational change. One possibility to achieve a 
representational change is through the hypothetical process 
of constraint relaxation (Isaak & Just, 1995; Knoblich et al., 
1999; Ohlsson, 1992). Self-imposed constraints that prevent 
a solution (for example, assumptions about rules that do not 
apply and that were never explicitly stated) need to be over-
come or relaxed before the problem can be solved.
The present study predicted that the rates of self-reported 
Aha! experiences might vary based on the necessary degree 
of constraint relaxation. The main assumption was that the 
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likelihood of experiencing an Aha! would decrease with 
increasing numbers of constraints that must be relaxed, 
because several steps are needed to achieve a representational 
change and solve the problem and thus, the main feature of 
suddenness of a solution might be lacking. In the following, 
each of the three problems used will be discussed in light 
of the potential constraints that they might impose on the 
problem solver.
Matchstick Arithmetic Problem. Knoblich and colleagues (1999; see 
also Knoblich, Ohlsson, & Raney, 2001; and Öllinger, Jones, & 
Knoblich, 2008) created a taxonomy of different types of Match-
stick Arithmetic. Problem difficulty was theoretically inferred 
from the degree of necessary constraint relaxation, and then 
empirically verified (Knoblich et al., 1999). A matchstick task 
from the operator problem type (CR2, see Öllinger et al., 2008), 
requiring an intermediate degree of constraint relaxation, was 
selected for this study. To solve this problem, the problem solver 
has to overcome one main constraint, namely the assumption 
that operators in equations should remain constant. A second 
constraint is posed by requiring the problem solver to break up 
the chunk that is formed by the operator (the “=” sign), using 
chunk decomposition (instead of moving a single matchstick 
that is not a part of a perceptual group).
8 Coin Problem (Ormerod et al., 2002). A study by Öllinger and col-
leagues (Öllinger, Jones, Faber, & Knoblich, 2013) was able 
to disentangle the different sources of difficulty in the 8 Coin 
Problem by systematically varying perceptual aspects of the 
original problem. They found that the main source of diffi-
culty was caused by a self-imposed 2-D constraint, but that 
even after a cue was given that showed coins stacked on top of 
each other (relaxing the 2-D constraint), an additional source 
of difficulty remained that originated from the tight perceptual 
groupings of the coins. Thus, decomposing the tight chunks in 
order to overcome these perceptual groupings represented a 
second constraint that was shown to hinder the solution.
9 Dot Problem (Maier, 1930). It has been shown by Kershaw and 
Ohlsson (2004) that the 9 Dot Problem entails several sources 
of difficulty. Even after relaxing the boundary constraint (i.e., 
realizing that the lines have to be drawn across the borders 
of the imaginary square), several obstacles remain before one 
can reach solution. In fact, many solvers are not able to reach 
a solution for the 9 Dot Problem, even with explicit hints 
(Chronicle, Ormerod, & MacGregor, 2001), because the new 
search space is too large. Just recently, Öllinger and colleagues 
were able to identify the necessity to restrict the new, larger 
search space after the relaxation of the boundary constraint as 
key to solution (Öllinger et al., 2014). In particular, realizing 
the necessity of so-called “non-dot turns” seems to constitute 
an additional constraint for the problem solver (Kershaw & 
Ohlsson, 2004). In addition, the number of non-dot turns 
required for a solution influenced solution rates, too, with 
lower solution rates for problems with two or more turns 
compared to problems with a single turn (Kershaw & Ohls-
son, 2004). There is a further constraint, namely realizing 
that one of the dots (the “apex dot”) must be crossed with 
lines repeatedly (Öllinger et al., 2014). The ability to engage 
in mental look-ahead to consider or imagine the placement 
of the 4 lines also seems to constrain solution success (Chein, 
Weisberg, Streeter, & Kwok, 2010; MacGregor, Ormerod, 
& Chronicle, 2001). As a result, there are at least three con-
straints that may need to be relaxed in solving this problem.
hyPotheSeS
Assuming that problems with more constraints are less likely 
to trigger sudden Aha! experiences, differing rates of reported 
Aha! experiences are expected among the three problems. Spe-
cifically, we predict lower rates of reported Aha! experiences 
for the 9 Dot Problem because it entails more constraints that 
need to be relaxed than the two other problems. The Match-
stick Arithmetic Problem requires overcoming the constraint 
that operators are not to be manipulated, and decomposing 
the operator. The 8 Coin Problem requires overcoming the 
2-D constraint and decomposing the tight perceptual group-
ing. Finally, the 9 Dot Problem requires the solver to over-
come the boundary constraint, to make non-dot turns, to use 
an apex dot, and to use mental-lookahead to restrict the much 
too large search space after the boundary constraint has been 
relaxed. Consequently, if the Aha! experience is tightly bound 
to constraint relaxation, we expect higher rates of reported 
Aha! experiences for the Matchstick Problem and for the 8 
Coin Problem than for the 9 Dot Problem.
Method
ParticiPantS
Healthy volunteers (N = 45, 14 males), most of them stu-
dents (age M = 24; range: 20–33), were recruited through 
announcements at the University of Munich. After giving 
informed consent, each participant was tested individually. 
None of them had any neurological diseases and all had nor-
mal or corrected-to-normal acuity.
MaterialS
9 Dot Problem.  This classical task (Maier, 1930) consists of 9 
dots that must be connected with 4 continuous lines, with-
out lifting the pen. In the correct solution, the lines extend 
through the “barriers” of the virtual square (see Appendix 
for problem solutions). Participants were presented with the 
dots depicted on a sheet of paper (as seen in Figure 1) and 
drew the lines directly on the sheet where space was pro-
vided for three separate drawing attempts.
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8 Coin Problem. The 8 Coin Problem was designed by Ormerod and 
colleagues (2002). The problem solver is required to move two 
coins in order to find a constellation where each coin touches 
exactly three other coins. The solution consists of forming two 
separate clusters of three coins each, and resting a fourth coin 
on top of each cluster. The eight 20-cent coins were spread 
out on a table and participants were allowed to touch the coins 
and move them around during the problem solving process. No 
hints were given. The initial arrangement of the coins (depicted 
in Figure 2) was always visible on a sheet of paper so that they 
could get back to the start configuration at any time.
Matchstick Arithmetic Problem. This problem was taken from 
a group of previously used matchstick arithmetic tasks 
(Knoblich et al., 1999): VIII = VI - II (operator type problem, 
CR2). The Roman numerals were constructed out of match-
sticks, and participants were asked to transform the incor-
rect arithmetic statement into a correct one by moving only 
one single matchstick. The given task requires moving a stick 
from the equal sign and putting it onto the minus sign: VIII - 
VI = II. Again, the initial arithmetic statement (see Figure 3) 
was depicted on a sheet of paper, with wooden matchsticks 
provided below. Participants were asked to move the match-
sticks, but could restart at any time.
Procedure
Individually, each participant was seated in a quiet room and 
was provided by the experimenter with a clear description of 
insightful (“with Aha!”) and noninsightful (“without Aha!”) 
solution experiences. To ensure comparability across studies, 
we used wording adapted from Jung-Beeman and colleagues 
(2004) (translated to German):
We would like to know whether you experienced a feel-
ing of insight when you solved the problem. A feeling 
of insight is a kind of “Aha!” characterized by sudden-
ness and obviousness. Like an enlightenment. You are 
relatively confident that your solution is correct with-
out having to check it. In contrast, you experienced no 
Aha! if the solution occurs to you slowly and stepwise. 
As an example, imagine a light bulb that is switched on 
all at once in contrast to slowly dimming it up. We ask 
for your subjective rating whether it felt like an Aha! 
experience or not, there is no right or wrong answer. 
Just follow your intuition.
Participants were told that they would need to sort their 
solutions on a trial-by-trial basis into these two catego-
ries. They were then asked to solve the three insight prob-
lems within an upper time limit of 7 minutes each. Each 
problem was separately instructed with a written instruction, 
and participants were asked to indicate if they were already 
familiar with a problem. Problem order was balanced across 
participants. Matchsticks, 20-cent coins, paper, and pencil were 
provided. The experimenter measured the solution time with a 
watch, from a separate adjacent room. Upon producing a cor-
rect solution within the time limit, the solution was shown to 
the experimenter, who confirmed its correctness. When the 
proposed solution was incorrect, the participant was told so 
and could resume solving. The experimenter then asked par-
ticipants whether they had experienced an Aha! or not. If they 
failed to produce a correct solution within the upper time limit, 
the experimenter interrupted the participant and, without tell-
ing the solution, moved on and presented the next problem.
reSultS
Because the problems were already familiar to participants 
in 8.9% of all 135 trials (135 = 45 participants x 3 problems), 
these trials had to be discarded. Solutions were further 
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divided into solved with Aha! and solved without Aha! cat-
egories. The distributions of solutions to the four catego-
ries (Solved with Aha!, Solved without Aha!, Unsolved, and 
Familiar) are shown in Table 1.
An Intraclass Correlation Coefficient (ICC) was com-
puted to examine whether the three problems resulted in 
similar patterns of frequencies across the three solution cat-
egories. This analysis yielded a low and negative ICC of -.046, 
indicating disagreement between the three problems. This 
means, the patterns of the solution score differed, as can also 
be seen in Figure 4 (next page).
Cochran’s Q Test for two related samples was used to fur-
ther explore the disagreements in solution rates and Aha! 
rates as shown in Figure 4. These pairwise comparisons 
showed that the Matchstick solution rate (82.2%) was signifi-
cantly higher than the solution rates of 8 Coin (26.7%) (Q(1) 
= 22.5, p < 0.01) and 9 Dot (11.1%) (Q(1) = 24, p < 0.01), but 
that solution rates did not differ between the 8 Coin and 9 
Dot (Q(1) = 2.3, p = 0.13). 
Across all problem types, participants reported that they 
had experienced an Aha! in only 51.9% of all correctly solved 
trials. First, the proportion of Aha! experiences out of total 
opportunities were analyzed because this led to more cells 
with 5 or more observations. Cochran’s Q Test for 2 related 
samples indicated that the rate of reported Aha! experiences 
for Matchsticks was significantly higher than the rate for 8 
Coin (Q(1) = 5.8, p < 0.05) as well as for 9 Dot (Q(1) = 16.2, 
p < 0.01). Also, the Aha! rate for 8 Coin was significantly 
higher than the one for 9 Dot (Q(1) = 5.4, p < 0.05).
The proportion of Aha! experiences out of correct solu-
tions was also examined, even though nearly all cells had 
fewer than 5 observations due to extremely low solving rates 
for 9 Dot and 8 Coin. This may be a more theoretically infor-
mative analysis because its results are independent of the 
greatly differing solution rates of the three problems, and it 
also takes into account that Aha! experiences could only be 
reported in solved trials. Looking at the data this way, the 9 
Dot Problem received the lowest ratio with only 20% of solu-
tions accompanied by an Aha! The Matchsticks Problem led 
to an Aha! in 51.4% of solutions, and the 8 Coin in 66.7% 
of solutions. However, Cochran’s Q Test for 2 related sam-
ples, which was computed for the same three comparisons as 
previously, was never significant, Matchstick vs. 8 Coin with 
(Q(1) = 0.2, p = 0.66), Matchstick vs. 9 Dot with (Q(1) = 0.3, 
p = 0.56), and 8 Coin vs. 9 Dot with (Q(1) = 1.0, p = 0.32).
diScuSSion
The present study examined solution rates and self-reported 
Aha! ratings for three classical insight problems. First, the 
solution rates were found to differ across the three problems, 
and these solution rates can be compared to those found in 
previous studies. Due to its notorious difficulty, researchers 
only rarely implement the 9 Dot Problem without hints, as was 
done in this study, but one such study reports solution rates of 
0% after participants were allowed 10 trials of drawing differ-
ent solution attempts in a booklet (MacGregor et al., 2001), 
but given no solution feedback. Another study (Chein et al., 
2010) reports very similar solution rates to the one found here, 
namely 10% (five participants from a n = 51 sample).
For the 8 Coin Problem, comparing the present results to 
Ormerod’s original study (2002), there is a strikingly large 
difference in solution rates: They found 0% during a time 
interval of four minutes. After these four minutes, partici-
pants were given two hints, which raised solution rates to 
92%. There are several possible explanations for this differ-
ence: First, it should be noted that Ormerod and colleagues 
collected only pilot data of 12 participants using this original 
coin configuration. Second, it is not clear whether partici-
pants had previously been informed that they would receive 
the hints. If so, this could have influenced solution rates. 
Third, the test material was different: Ormerod used hexago-
nal metal tokens (possibly based in British 20- and 50-pence 
coins) in order to facilitate the evaluation of the number 
of contacts between coins, whereas this study used 20-cent 
Euro coins, which are circular. This may have increased the 
difficulty of chunk decomposition because the hexagonal 
tokens create a more “tight” perceptual grouping than the 
circular coins. Fourth, the time limits differed (four minutes 
in the original study before a hint was given; seven minutes 
here). That time is a crucial factor is further supported by 
the comparison with another study on the 8 Coin Prob-
lem, where an even higher solution rate, 40%, was reported 
(Öllinger et al., 2013) and participants were allowed as many 
Table 1
Solution rates (frequencies) for the three problems. For unsolved trials, no Aha! could be reported. 
Note that the percentages for each column sum to 100%.
Matchstick 8 Coin 9 Dot Σ
Solved With Aha! 19 (42.2%) 8 (17.8%) 1 (2.2%) 28 (20.7%)
Solved Without Aha! 18 (40.0%) 4 (8.9%) 4 (8.9%) 26 (19.3%)
Unsolved 6 (13.4%) 31 (68.9%) 32 (71.1%) 69 (51.1%)
Familiar 2 (4.4%) 2 (4.4%) 8 (17.8%) 12 (8.9%)
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Figure 4. Number of participants (out of 45) who solved the problem with or without reporting 
an Aha! experience, failed to solve, or were already familiar with the problem. 
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one for 9 Dot (Q(1) = 5.4, p<0.05). 
solution attempts as they wished. That both the present study 
and Öllinger’s study tested larger samples (45 and 28, respec-
tively) than the original study (12 participants), might be an 
additional reason for the differing solution rates. 
For the Matchstick Pr blem, it was r ther difficult to find 
studies using exactly the same problem configuration, but 
comparable problems from the operator group (CR2) led to 
solution rates around 60% after six minutes (Öllinger et al., 
2008). Another study reports solution rates for CR2 problems 
of about 68% after five minutes (data from block 1 of Experi-
ment 2 in Knoblich et al., 1999). Note that in contrast to the 
present design, both studies presented the Matchstick Prob-
lems on a computer screen and had participants solve them “in 
the head.” Another difference was that both studies included 
sets of several problems, and prior work has suggested that 
the order of Matchstick Problems c  cause fixation effects 
(Öllinger et al., 2008). Together with the lower time limit, this 
might account for the lower solution rates in prior work. 
Second, although the problems used here have all been 
considered to be “insight problems,” participants reported 
that they had only experienced an Aha! approximately half 
the time that problems were solved correctly. Compared 
to other studies using trial-wise insight ratings, the pres-
ent finding is quite typical. Other studies, using CRA prob-
lems, report numbers between 50% and 60% (Kounios et al., 
2008; Subramaniam et al., 2009; Sandkühler & Bhattacha-
rya, 2008; Wegbreit, Suzuki, Grabowecky, Kounios, & Bee-
man, 2012). Fedor, Szathmáry, and Öllinger (2015) found 
for Katona’s Five Square Problem (Katona, 1940) that 74% of 
all solvers reported an Aha! experience. The present finding 
that only half of all solutions were classified as Aha! solutions 
casts doubt on the research practice of simply assuming that 
insight has taken place if an “insight problem” is solved. In 
particular, only 1 out of 5 participants w o had solved the 9 
Dot Problem reported an Aha! experience. Of course, this 
makes this problem seem especially problematic when it is 
used as a typical “insight problem” without any concurrent 
measurements of participants’ actual solving experience. 
Further, the fact that some participants received feedback 
about their solution accuracy before reaching a correct solu-
tion could have contributed to the low overall Aha! rates if 
we see this feedback as a sort of hint, because it has been 
shown that providing hints causes more incremental and less 
insight-like patterns, as measured by feeling-of-warmth rat-
ings (Cushen & Wiley, 2012; Davidson, 1995). 
The main question that was tested by the present study was 
whet er the rates f self-reported Aha! experiences in three 
classical insight problems could be predicted based on the 
necessary degree of constraint relaxation. As expected, dif-
fering rates of Aha! (based on total solving opportunities) 
were found across the three problems: The Matchstick Prob-
lem triggered the highest Aha! rates, followed by the 8 Coin 
Problem, and then the 9 Dot Problem with the lowest rate. 
Note that if proportions of solutions are analysed instead of 
proportions of total problem attempts, there is a small change 
in the overall pattern such that the rate for 8 Coin appears 
higher and more similar to the rate for Matchsticks. However, 
the main result of the 9 Dot Problem triggering a much lower 
Figure 4
Number of participants (out of 45) who solved the problem with or without reporting an Aha! experi-
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Aha! rate than the other two problems stays the same across 
both analyses. This is consistent with the hypothesis that solu-
tions for which fewer constraints need to be relaxed feel more 
sudden and thus more like an “Aha!” than multi-step solu-
tions with several constraints that must be overcome. 
An alternative to considering the number of constraints is 
considering the type of constraints that need to be relaxed, 
the consequences that follow from relaxation, and the order 
in which the constraints are relaxed. These factors influence 
whether the search space for a given problem gets enlarged 
(making a solution less likely) or restricted (facilitating a solu-
tion). Starting with the 8 Coin Problem, assume that the first 
constraint to be relaxed would be the 2-D constraint. When 
it is relaxed, it increases the search space for solution. How-
ever, as soon as the solver is able to overcome the perceptual 
grouping and considers breaking up the adjacent coins, then 
there are only two coins that can be moved to break up the 
starting configuration into two equal groups of three coins. 
This means relaxing the second constraint (perceptual group-
ing) in the 8 Coin Problem restricts the search space again 
and thus might quickly lead to a solution. Of course the order 
in which these two constraints are relaxed could theoretically 
also be reversed: The problem solver could realize first that 
it is necessary to break up the tight perceptual grouping and 
form two separate groups of three coins each by taking the 
two “inner” coins and then, while moving them around, relax 
the 2-D constraint. For this sequence of constraint relaxation, 
which appears less likely than the first, breaking up the group-
ing might already feel like a restriction of the search space 
(since the target coins are identified), but this does not neces-
sarily lead to a solution. Only if the problem solver proceeds 
with relaxing the second remaining constraint (2-D), and 
realizes that coins must be stacked on top of each other, does 
the search space finally narrow. This solution process appears 
less swift than the prior one and thus might be less likely to 
be accompanied by Aha! experiences, because the criterion of 
suddenness is lacking. This could account for the small pro-
portion of solutions without Aha! for the 8 Coin Problem.
Similarly, with the Matchstick Problem, there are two con-
straints that need to be relaxed. The solver needs to overcome 
the assumption that operators are not to be manipulated and 
also recognize that the perceptual grouping of the opera-
tor (the equal sign) needs to be decomposed. Because these 
constraints are both directly related to the operator, relaxing 
one constraint might relate to simultaneously relaxing the 
other, quickly restricting the search space, and thus lead sud-
denly to a solution. If the two constraints are instead relaxed 
sequentially, the most likely sequence would be to first relax 
the operator constraint and then decompose the grouping. 
However, the reverse order seems also plausible: First, par-
ticipants might realize that they must break up chunks such 
as the V (which enlarges the search space since not only 
the individual matchsticks that make up numerals such as 
II and III can be used, but also the ones belonging to the 
V), and later they might realize that the operator must be 
manipulated (again, closing the search space). This sequence 
appears as likely as the first, but less likely to trigger a feeling 
of suddenness and Aha! This reasoning could account for the 
larger proportion of solutions without Aha! for the Match-
stick Problem than the 8 Coin.
In contrast, the solution process for the 9 Dot Problem 
seems to be qualitatively very different. When the first con-
straint is relaxed (the boundary constraint), it enlarges the 
search space. Realizing that one needs to make non-dot 
turns, however, does not restrict the enlarged search space 
because they could, theoretically, be made at any location 
outside the area of the given nine dots (Öllinger et al., 2014). 
Thus, relaxing the second constraint in the 9 Dot Problem 
might not lead as quickly to a solution as in the other prob-
lems because there still remain several other constraints such 
as realizing that one needs to use an apex dot, or finding the 
correct number of non-dot turns. Because there are multi-
ple constraints that need to be relaxed, and because achiev-
ing each of these partial insights is likely to occur over an 
extended span of time rather than all at once, solutions to the 
9 Dot Problem are less likely to trigger a feeling of sudden-
ness and Aha! regardless of the order they are relaxed in. This 
could account for the large number of solutions that were not 
accompanied by an Aha! experience for this problem.
Of course, depending on their prior knowledge, problem 
solvers might not encounter all constraints that have been 
identified in the above task analysis. In addition, the order 
in which constraints are likely to be relaxed for each prob-
lem as discussed above are hypothetical, as the present study 
did not collect any trace data that might be used to confirm 
these assumptions. Ideally, future research should employ 
converging methods including think-aloud or eye-tracking 
methods that might be used to track solution processes, in 
addition to obtaining self-reports about Aha! experiences, so 
that the connection between solution processes and the Aha! 
experience can be made more directly.
This relates to some other conceptual limitations of the pres-
ent study. For example, it remains unclear whether a repre-
sentational change actually took place or whether an impasse 
occurred during solving. Thus, the results of this study cannot 
speak to the question of possible differences in the problem 
solving process between participants reporting Aha! and par-
ticipants not reporting it. Several methods have been used in 
the past to try to capture problem solving processes. In addition 
to using think-aloud protocols (Ash, Jee, & Wiley, 2012; Cran-
ford & Moss, 2012; Fleck & Weisberg, 2004; Newell & Simon, 
1972), recording eye movements can also offer valuable insights 
into the solution process (Knoblich et al., 2001; Ellis et al., 2011). 
Another alternative is to conduct a move analysis (Öllinger et 
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al., 2013; Ormerod et al., 2002) where the experimenter records 
the start and end point of each move while participants are solv-
ing problems with external objects. Examining the frequency 
of first moves can be used to infer possible biases in the initial 
problem representation. Similarly, recording when participants 
first start stacking coins on top of each other, going outside of 
the perimeter of the box, and touching or pointing to the opera-
tors in the matchstick problem can be used to infer when par-
ticipants relax constraints. A detailed move analysis can also 
be conducted online, with a computer program recording par-
ticipants’ drag-and-drop mouse movements and reaction times 
(Fedor, Szathmáry, & Öllinger, 2015). Finally, obtaining ratings 
of problem features at multiple time points (Ash & Wiley, 2008; 
Cushen & Wiley, 2012) can also be used to track changes in 
problem representations during the solution process. 
Collecting subjective measures of Aha! experiences has the 
advantage that it offers researchers the possibility to compare 
insight with noninsight solutions instead of just assuming that 
problems are being solved with insight. This was first success-
fully done by Jung-Beeman and colleagues (2004) with their 
set of CRA problems, but other promising new approaches to 
insight research, such as Rebus puzzles (MacGregor & Cun-
ningham, 2008) or magic tricks (Danek, Fraps, von Müller, 
Grothe, & Öllinger, 2013, 2014b), offer the same possibility 
because a large set of tasks can be created. In particular, the 
domain of magic tricks seems ideally suited to investigate 
insight because the typical constraints encountered by prob-
lem solvers are well-known and systematically manipulated 
by the magician, triggering an initial problem representation 
that is misleading. When participants gain insight into a magic 
trick, that is, discover how the trick works, they report strong 
feelings of Aha! (Danek, Fraps, von Müller, Grothe, & Öllinger, 
2014a). Further, Danek and colleagues found that solutions to 
magic tricks that occurred with insight were reached earlier, 
received higher confidence ratings, and were also more likely 
to be true than noninsight solutions (2014b).
Across studies, variations in experimenters’ instructions 
for insight ratings may be responsible for different findings. 
The simple dichotomic insight/noninsight rating used here 
is probably not sufficient to fully capture the complex phe-
nomenology of the Aha! experience, which has been shown 
to consist of at least 4 different components, namely “sudden-
ness,” “surprise,” ‘happiness,” and “certainty” (Danek et al., 
2014a). Further components, like the feeling of relief upon 
obtaining the solution or heightened motivation for the next 
task, were suggested when participants were asked to pro-
vide qualitative self-reports instead of ratings (“For you, how 
does an Aha! moment feel like? Please describe it in your own 
words!”, Danek et al., 2014a, p. 5). Processing fluency has also 
been suggested as an underlying mechanism (Topolinski & 
Reber, 2010). Only some of these components are reflected 
in the instruction that was used in the present study. This 
limitation also applies to many other studies using self-reports 
of insight, with some of them assessing only the component of 
suddenness (Aziz-Zadeh et al., 2009; Ellis et al., 2011). Further 
research is needed to disentangle these different aspects of the 
Aha! experience and their relations to the solution process.
Obviously, the optimal method for determining the occur-
rence of insight has not been found yet. As one step toward 
this aim, instead of using predefined insight problems and 
assuming the occurrence of insight if the problem is solved, 
researchers need converging subjective or behavioral mea-
sures that can help to take into account participants’ actual 
problem solving experiences. 
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aPPendix
INSIGHT PROBLEMS WITHOUT AHA                                   
	
Appendix 
A. Solution for the 9 Dot Problem. 
B. Solution for the 8 Coin Problem. 
C. Solution for the Matchstick Arithmetic Problem. 
